Making Sense of the Trump Administration's Fuel Economy Standard Rollback by Bordoff, Jason E. et al.
MAKING SENSE OF THE 
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S 
FUEL ECONOMY STANDARD 
ROLLBACK
BY JASON BORDOFF, JOSHUA LINN, AND AKOS LOSZ
APRIL 2018
ABOUT THE CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY
The Center on Global Energy Policy provides independent, balanced, data-driven analysis 
to help policymakers navigate the complex world of energy. We approach energy as an 
economic, security, and environmental concern. And we draw on the resources of a world-
class institution, faculty with real-world experience, and a location in the world’s finance and 
media capital. 
 
Visit us at www.energypolicy.columbia.edu 
         @ColumbiaUenergy             
     
ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
SIPA’s mission is to empower people to serve the global public interest. Our goal is to foster 
economic growth, sustainable development, social progress, and democratic governance 
by educating public policy professionals, producing policy-related research, and conveying 
the results to the world. Based in New York City, with a student body that is 50 percent 
international and educational partners in cities around the world, SIPA is the most global of 
public policy schools.  
 
For more information, please visit www.sipa.columbia.edu
MAKING SENSE OF THE 
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S 
FUEL ECONOMY STANDARD 
ROLLBACK
BY JASON BORDOFF, JOSHUA LINN, AND AKOS LOSZ
APRIL 2018
1255 Amsterdam Ave 
New York NY 10027
www.energypolicy.columbia.edu
         @ColumbiaUenergy 
MAKING SENSE OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FUEL ECONOMY STANDARD ROLLBACK
3 |  CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMBIA SIPA
For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, the authors wish to thank Joseph Aldy, 
Alan Krupnick, Virginia McConnell, and James Stock. 
This work was made possible by support from the Center on Global Energy Policy. More 
information is available at http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/about/mission. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Jason Bordoff is a former senior director on the staff of the National Security Council and 
special assistant to President Obama. He is now a professor of professional practice in 
international and public affairs and the founding director of the Center on Global Energy 
Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. 
Joshua Linn is an associate professor at the University of Maryland and a senior fellow at 
Resources for the Future. Linn previously worked as a senior economist for the Council of 
Economic Advisors under the Obama Administration. He was an assistant professor in the 
economics department at the University of Illinois at Chicago and a research scientist at MIT.
Akos Losz is a senior research associate for the Center on Global Energy Policy. Prior to 
joining Columbia, Losz was senior analyst at Douglas-Westwood. Previously, he worked on the 
strategy-development team of MOL Group, a Hungary-based international energy company. 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
MAKING SENSE OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FUEL ECONOMY STANDARD ROLLBACK




What Did the EPA Do in Its Recent Announcement? 
The Estimated Impacts of Model Year 2022–2025 Standards  
on US Fuel Consumption and Net Petroleum Imports
Table 1. Annual impacts of the 2022–2025 standards on US fuel consumption
Figure 1. US gasoline consumption in the EIA Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2018  
reference case with and without MY 2022–2025 standards (million barrels per day
Table 2. US oil import reductions due to the 2022–2025 standards
Figure 2. US net imports of crude oil and petroleum products in the EIA’s AEO 2018, 
projections with and without MY 2022–2025 standards (millions of barrels per day)
The Estimated Impact of Model Year 2022–2025 Standards on GHG Emissions
Table 3. Model year lifetime emission reductions due to the 2022–2025 standards  
in the United States
Figure 3. US transport sector emissions in the EIA AEO 2018 reference case with 
and without MY 2022–2025 standards (million tons of CO2 equivalent)
Table 4. Annual emission reductions due to the 2022–2025 standards in the US
Figure 4. US transport and electricity sector emissions (million tons of CO2 equivalent)
How Might the Agencies Conclude That Weaker Standards Benefit Society?
Table 5. EPA and NHTSA cost and benefit estimates from 2016 (billion 2017 dollars)
Table 6. Effects of updated social cost of carbon on estimated net benefits (billion 
2017 dollars)
Figure 5. Retail gasoline prices in various EIA AEO editions (2017 $/gallon)
Figure 6. Vehicle miles traveled in various EIA AEO editions (billion miles)
Figure 7. Percentage of light trucks in total passenger vehicle sales in various EIA  
Annual Energy Outlook editions (% of total)



































MAKING SENSE OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FUEL ECONOMY STANDARD ROLLBACK
5 |  CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMBIA SIPA
On April 2, 2018, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced that planned 
fuel economy increases for model year 2022–2025 cars and light trucks are too stringent and 
should be revised.1 The EPA thus initiated a process to set new standards for 2022–2025, in 
partnership with the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA). 
Although the agencies may eventually ease fuel economy standards less than a full rollback of 
the standards to 2021 levels would imply, for illustrative purposes we assess the implications 
of a full rollback for gasoline consumption, oil imports, and carbon emissions. Given that 
the agencies’ 2016 analysis suggests that a full rollback would harm society on balance, 
we discuss which changes to the 2016 analysis might lead the agencies to conclude that a 
rollback benefits society. 
To facilitate discussion of these important public policy issues, this paper makes two points 
about the EPA’s announcement: 
Due to the gradual turnover of the on-road vehicle fleet, eliminating the tighter fuel 
economy standards for 2022–2025 would have small effects on gasoline consumption, 
greenhouse gas emissions, and oil imports during those years and even out to 2030. 
However, the ultimate impact of the weaker standards could be greater, especially if they hurt 
the progress of new technologies and the political momentum for tighter standards in the 
United States and in other countries over the longer term. 
Changes in the social cost of carbon, fuel prices, miles traveled, and market shares of 
light trucks since the 2016 analysis are unlikely to cause the benefits of rolling back the 
standards to exceed the costs. If the agencies conclude that the benefits of rolling back 
the standards exceed the costs, the reasoning will likely be based on other factors, such as 
consumer willingness to pay for fuel-saving technologies or the cost and effectiveness of 
those technologies.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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On April 2, 2018, the EPA announced that planned fuel economy increases for cars and light 
trucks in model years 2022–2025 are too stringent and should be revised.2 The EPA thus 
initiated a process to set new standards for 2022–2025, in partnership with the NHTSA. 
The standards were a central part of the Obama administration’s efforts to reduce US 
greenhouse gas emissions. The move to weaken the standards has been sharply criticized by 
many environmental groups, policymakers, and others. Supporters of the current standards 
argue that the standards would substantially reduce emissions at a modest cost. But the 
standards have been highly controversial, and the move has also received a great deal of 
praise from other groups. Supporters of weakening the standards—including those in the 
Trump administration—argue that the current standards would be excessively costly to 
consumers and automakers, while providing little or no benefit to the public.
Many analyses have proclaimed that this announcement would have profound effects on 
consumers, oil consumption, oil imports, and greenhouse gas emissions. One think tank, for 
example, told the Financial Times that US oil consumption, which was nearly 20 million barrels 
per day (bpd) in 2017, would be 1.5 million bpd higher in 2025 if the 2022–2025 fuel economy 
standards were rolled back.3  
In addition to such bold—and often incorrect—pronouncements, there has been little 
discussion of the hurdles the agencies have to clear before they can finalize new standards. 
At the very end of the Obama administration, in early 2017, the EPA concluded that the 
2022–2025 standards are technologically feasible and appropriate under the Clean Air Act. 
In setting new standards that survive legal challenge, the agencies will have to explain why 
the previous analysis was wrong, either by providing new information or reassessing earlier 
information. In an analysis conducted in 2016, the EPA and the NHTSA also concluded that the 
economic and societal benefits of the 2022–2025 standards—which include fuel cost savings 
to consumers and greenhouse gas reductions, among others—far exceed the costs. 
Although the agencies may eventually ease fuel economy standards less than a full rollback 
of the standards to 2021 levels would imply, we assess the implications of a full rollback 
for gasoline consumption, oil imports, and carbon emissions. Given that the agencies’ 2016 
analysis suggests that a full rollback would harm society on balance, we discuss which 
changes to the 2016 analysis might lead the agencies to conclude that a rollback benefits 
society. To facilitate discussion of these important public policy issues, this paper makes two 
points about the EPA’s announcement: 
Due to the gradual turnover of the on-road vehicle fleet, eliminating the tighter fuel 
economy standards for 2022–2025 would have small effects on gasoline consumption, 
greenhouse gas emissions, and oil imports during those years and even out to 2030. 
However, the ultimate impact of the weaker standards could be greater, especially if they hurt 
the progress of new technologies and the political momentum for tighter standards in the 
INTRODUCTION
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United States and in other countries over the longer term. 
Changes in the social cost of carbon, fuel prices, miles traveled, and market shares of 
light trucks since the 2016 analysis are unlikely to cause the benefits of rolling back the 
standards to exceed the costs. If the agencies conclude that the benefits of rolling back 
the standards exceed the costs, the reasoning will likely be based on other factors, such as 
consumer willingness to pay for fuel-saving technologies or the cost and effectiveness of 
those technologies.
Our conclusions in this paper rest on our analysis of recent documents from the EPA and the 
NHTSA and from projections by the EIA.
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Fuel economy standards for light trucks have been tightening since 2005, and standards 
for cars have been tightening since 2011. The Obama administration set corporate average 
fuel economy (CAFE) standards for passenger vehicles, first for model year 2011 (finalized in 
2009), then for model years 2012–2016 (finalized in 2010), and finally for model years 2017–
2025 (finalized in 2012). 
Following a 20-year period of essentially unchanged standards, the standards between 
2012 and 2025 would roughly double new vehicle fuel economy. Because each vehicle’s fuel 
economy target depends on its footprint and class (car or light truck), the actual level of fuel 
economy that the new vehicles achieve depends on the mix of vehicles that automakers sell. 
The fuel economy targets are generally higher for cars than for light trucks and are higher for 
smaller vehicles than for larger ones. Therefore, if light trucks account for a larger share of 
sales, then the level of fuel economy that the standards require would be lower than if light 
trucks account for a smaller share. In their 2012 analysis, the agencies estimated that the 
2025 standards would achieve 54.5 miles per gallon. This number refers to the result of fuel 
economy tests that the EPA conducts. These tests typically overstate the fuel economy that a 
vehicle might actually achieve in real-world conditions so that 54.5 miles per gallon translates 
to about 35–40 miles per gallon on the window stickers displayed at car dealerships—roughly 
twice the fuel economy on window stickers in 2012.
In setting the higher fuel economy standards, the Obama administration agreed that in 2018 
the federal government would complete a midterm evaluation of the current 2017–2025 
standards to determine whether the targets for model years 2022–2025 need readjustment 
in either direction. The evaluation could change other aspects of the program, such as 
the manner of crediting plug-in and fuel cell vehicles. In one of the last acts of the Obama 
administration, the EPA (led by administrator Gina McCarthy at the time) completed the 
required midterm evaluation in a compressed timeframe and finalized the standards through 
2025 in January 2017. The decision referred to a benefit-cost analysis that the EPA and the 
NHTSA had performed in mid-2016, which showed that the benefits far exceed the costs. 
In March 2017, however, the Trump administration’s EPA reopened the midterm evaluation 
process, claiming that the current standards are “costly for automakers and the American 
people.”4 Note that a new benefit-cost analysis will accompany new 2022–2025 standards, but 
regulatory procedures do not require that the benefits of those standards exceed the costs.
BACKGROUND
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In the wake of the EPA’s April 2 announcement, many commentators mistakenly described 
the impacts of “rolling back fuel economy standards” by citing data about the total oil 
consumption and greenhouse gas reductions of all the fuel economy increases enacted by the 
Obama administration.5 Such estimates are misleading because the EPA has not announced 
that it will eliminate all of the Obama administration’s fuel economy increases. Rather, it has 
announced, pursuant to the scheduled midterm evaluation, that it will reconsider the planned 
increases for cars and light trucks in model years 2022–2025. The EPA must go through a 
notice-and-comment process to set new standards, and it remains to be seen how the agency 
will modify the planned 2022–2025 standards—and how sharply it will roll them back. Below, 
we estimate the impacts of rolling back entirely the planned 2022–2025 increases, although 
the actual impacts may turn out to be less significant. 
The EPA and the NHTSA have coordinated their standards until now, and presumably they 
will continue to do so. Even if the agencies roll back the planned increases between 2022 and 
2025 entirely, it is important to note that California retains the legal authority to set stricter 
standards than the national ones, and other states can adopt California’s standards. Currently, 
13 other states follow California’s tighter standards for cars and light trucks.6 These states—
together with California—represent about 35 percent of US sales of new passenger vehicles.7  
An open question is whether the Trump administration will revoke the waiver that gives 
California this authority. If the EPA does not revoke the waiver, then the California standards 
would differ from the federal standards, which would be economically inefficient because one 
set of standards or the other would be redundant, and total compliance costs would be higher 
than if there were uniform standards. On the other hand, revoking the waiver would set up a 
contentious legal and political battle. 
WHAT DID THE EPA DO IN ITS RECENT 
ANNOUNCEMENT?
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According to the EPA’s 2016 analysis, the current 2022–2025 standards will reduce fuel 
consumption by 1.2 billion barrels (50.4 billion gallons) of gasoline over the lifetime of the 
vehicles sold in those model years.8 For context, in 2017 the United States consumed about 7.3 
billion barrels of oil and 140 billion gallons of gasoline per year. 
Table 1 shows the effects of the standards on consumption by calendar year. The effects are 
relatively modest in the first several years of the standards because the standards raise the 
fuel economy of new vehicles only, and new vehicles typically account for about 10 percent of 
miles traveled in any given year. However, the magnitude of the reductions grows over time 
as the older vehicles with low fuel economy are replaced by newer vehicles subject to the 
standards.
The EIA projects that gasoline consumption will begin declining after 2020. Relative to that 
projected decline, the EPA’s 2016 analysis indicates the impact of rolling back the 2022–2025 
standards entirely: increased consumption of about 249,000 bpd of gasoline in 2025, rising 
gradually to 626,000 bpd in 2030; 923,000 bpd in 2035; 1.1 million bpd in 2040; 1.3 million 
bpd in 2045; and 1.4 million bpd in 2050 (see figure 1).9  Thus, rolling back the standards to 
2021 levels would have a small effect on consumption through 2025 and even 2030, relative to 
projected consumption levels.
Note that the sum of the annual impacts in table 1 through 2050 is significantly greater 
(at around 9.25 billion barrels) than the estimated aggregate fuel consumption impact of 
vehicles sold in model years 2022–2025 alone. This is because the EPA’s annual estimates 
assume (reasonably) that fuel economy standards will continue to apply post-2025, and thus 
the savings associated with the model year 2022–2025 standards will continue to accrue to 
vehicles sold beyond these model years as well.10 
THE ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF MODEL 
YEAR 2022–2025 STANDARDS ON US FUEL 
CONSUMPTION AND NET PETROLEUM IMPORTS
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Table 1: Annual impacts of the 2022–2025 standards on US fuel consumption
Calendar Year
Gasoline Consumption  
(billion barrels)
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Figure 1: US gasoline consumption in the EIA Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2018 reference case with and without MY 
2022–2025 standards (million barrels per day) 
Source: EIA, EPA
The EPA estimates the incremental impact of the proposed 2022–2025 standards on net oil 
imports to be 169,000 bpd in 2025, 420,000 bpd in 2030, 685,000 bpd in 2035, 880,000 bpd 
in 2040, and 1.119 million bpd by 2050 (see table 2).11  As an approximation, the EPA assumes 
that 90 percent of the oil consumption impact will translate to net import reductions.12 
Table 2: US oil import reductions due to the 2022–2025 standards
Calendar Year











According to the EIA, the United States will become a net oil exporter in 2029 (i.e., negative 
net imports). If the 2022–2025 standards are rolled back entirely, according to EIA reference 
case projections, the resulting higher US oil consumption means that the United States never 
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becomes a net exporter of oil (see figure 2). To date, US oil and gas production has exceeded 
EIA projections, and in a scenario with higher oil and gas production, the United States be-
comes a net oil exporter in 2021 and remains one regardless of what happens to fuel econo-
my standards, although weaker standards reduce the magnitude of net exports (for example, 
around 400,000 bpd in 2030). 
Figure 2: US net imports of crude oil and petroleum products in the EIA’s AEO 2018, projections with and without MY 
2022–2025 standards (millions of barrels per day) 
Source: EIA, EPA
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In 2016, the EPA estimated that the 2022–2025 standards would reduce emissions by about 540 
million tons of CO2 equivalent for passenger vehicles sold in those model years (see table 3).13 
Table 3: Model year lifetime emission reductions due to the 2022–2025 standards in the United States
Model Year
GHG Emissions  








Completely rolling back the model year 2022–2025 standards to 2021 levels and maintaining 
the standards at 2021 levels after 2025 would increase emissions by about 41 million tons of 
CO2 equivalent in 2025, 102 million tons in 2030, 186 million tons in 2040, and 234 million 
tons in 2050 (see figure 3 and table 4).14 Through at least 2025, these emissions reductions 
are small compared to transportation sector emissions.
Figure 3: US transport sector emissions in the EIA AEO 2018 reference case with and without MY 2022–2025  
standards (million tons of CO2 equivalent) 
Source: EIA, EPA
THE ESTIMATED IMPACT OF MODEL YEAR 
2022–2025 STANDARDS ON GHG EMISSIONS
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Table 4: Annual emission reductions due to the 2022–2025 standards in the United States
Model Year
GHG Emissions  








In announcing the midterm evaluation decision to reconsider the 2022–2025 standards, EPA 
administrator Scott Pruitt noted that the United States has led the world in greenhouse gas 
reductions and said that “the auto sector…has been the leader in achieving that.”15 That is 
untrue. US transportation sector emissions have been rising and recently surpassed power 
sector emissions, which have been falling, according to EIA data (figure 4).
Figure 4: US transport and electricity sector emissions (million tons of CO2 equivalent) 
Source: EIA Monthly Energy Review 
What is true is that many countries, such as Canada, link their fuel economy or emissions 
standards to the US standards. If the United States relaxes its standards, some of those 
countries may also decide to relax theirs. In that case the effect on global emissions of 
weakening US standards could be greater than suggested in table 4. However, the estimates 
presented above suggest that absent such global responses, rolling back US standards would 
have modest effects on gasoline consumption, net petroleum imports, and emissions through 
at least 2025.
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Although the EPA explained the reasoning behind its decision, it will have to provide 
additional analysis to accompany the final standards. A series of executive orders require 
benefit-cost analysis when agencies issue economically significant rules (typically with 
benefits or costs exceeding $100 million). The new regulations would certainly meet this 
threshold. Although a new regulation does not have to strictly pass a benefit-cost test, the 
agencies would have to conduct one, and at any rate it would be highly unusual for the 
agencies to finalize a regulation whose costs exceed the benefits. For example, when the EPA 
proposed repealing the Clean Power Plan, it published a benefit-cost analysis showing positive 
net benefits (benefits minus costs) from the repeal. In all likelihood, net benefits of the new 
standards (relative to maintaining current standards) would need to be positive, meaning that 
society is better off with the new standards than with the current ones.
In 2016, the EPA and the NHTSA provided a draft Technical Assessment Report, which 
included a benefit-cost analysis of the 2022–2025 standards. The agencies compared the 
benefits and costs of achieving those standards rather than maintaining the standards at the 
2021 levels for the model years 2022–2025. The EPA and the NHTSA conducted separate 
analyses, and both concluded that the benefits exceed the costs (see table 5). Therefore, if 
one maintained the exact same assumptions as in the agencies’ 2016 analyses, one would 
conclude that setting standards at 2021 levels rather than the current 2022–2025 levels would 
have negative net benefits. Consequently, if the agencies are to estimate positive net benefits 
for rolling back the standards to 2021 levels, then the agencies must use different assumptions 
than they used in 2016. 
Table 5: EPA and NHTSA cost and benefit estimates from 2016 (billion 2017 dollars)16
EPA
(Includess MY 2021-2025 vehicles)
NHTSA
(Includess MY 2017-2025 vehicles)
Total costs 37.88 91.54
Total benefits 136.79 184.14
Fuel savings 93.65 126.27
CO2 benefits 19.57 28.41
Other benefits 23.57 29.46
Net benefits 98.91 92.59
Source: Authors’ own estimates based on EPA, NHTSA assessment reports
 
Because fuel cost savings account for most of the benefits in table 5, the agencies may 
HOW MIGHT THE AGENCIES CONCLUDE THAT 
WEAKER STANDARDS BENEFIT SOCIETY?
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reconsider whether and how such savings are counted in the benefit-cost analyses. In their 
2016 analysis, the agencies argue that there is a market failure for fuel economy, which is 
sometimes referred to as the energy efficiency gap or energy paradox. The agencies argue 
that without fuel economy standards, the automakers would provide too little fuel economy 
from consumers’ perspectives. This market failure could occur if consumers act irrationally 
when choosing vehicle fuel economy, but there is disagreement about whether consumers 
act irrationally and the market failure exists.17 Without a market failure for fuel economy, 
the standards would not make consumers better off (even if society benefits from lower 
emissions and oil imports). Given the importance of fuel cost savings in the estimated benefits 
of the standards, changing the assumptions on the market failure for fuel economy could 
substantially reduce net benefits of the current standards. If the agencies argue there is 
no market failure for fuel economy, such a change could have implications for many other 
regulations, such as energy efficiency standards, and this issue is beyond the scope of  
the paper. 
In this section, we assess more straightforward changes to assumptions: whether changes in 
the estimated social cost of carbon dioxide (SCC), expected gasoline prices, miles traveled, or 
the share of light trucks in total sales could result in positive net benefits.
The SCC measures the long-term damage in US dollar terms caused by emitting one metric 
ton of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere in a particular year. Equivalently, the SCC measures 
the societal benefit of reducing emissions by one metric ton. Federal agencies have used 
the SCC to estimate the benefits of many regulations that reduce carbon emissions. Two 
important inputs into the computation of the SCC are whether global—as opposed to US—
benefits of carbon reductions are included and the rate used to discount future benefits. Prior 
to the Trump administration, the preferred value of the SCC included global benefits and used 
a 3 percent discount rate as the central estimate. In contrast, the Trump administration has 
included only US rather than global benefits, which reduces the SCC by about 87 percent. The 
administration has also reported an SCC using a 7 percent discount rate in addition to the 3 
percent discount rate.18 
Given these changes in the SCC, we assume that an updated benefit-cost analysis of rolling 
back the 2022–2025 standards would use domestic benefits. Table 6 shows the effects on the 
estimated net benefits of including only US benefits in the SCC. Comparing net benefits in 
tables 5 and 6, the net benefits are about 17–27 percent lower using the lower SCC, although 
they remain positive. 
We use a 3 percent rather than a 7 percent discount rate for the SCC to maintain consistency 
with the other benefit and cost numbers in table 5, all of which use a 3 percent discount rate.
Although not shown in the table, using a 7 percent rather than a 3 percent discount rate for 
the SCC would further reduce the net benefits, but they would remain positive. To understand 
the importance of discount rates, imagine that climate change damages in 2100 totaled $1 
trillion. Using a 3 percent discount rate, that would be worth spending $83 billion in 2017 
to prevent; using a 7 percent discount rate, it would be worth only $4 billion. In effect, high 
discount rates mean that we place relatively little value on the harm our current actions cause 
to future generations. 
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Table 6: Effects of updated social cost of carbon on estimated net benefits (billion 2017 dollars)19
EPA NHTSA
CO2 benefits (global) 19.57 28.41
CO2 benefits (domestic) 2.61 3.79
Updated net benefits 81.95 67.98
Source: Authors’ own estimates based on EPA, NHTSA assessment reports
 
The 2016 analysis used EIA projections from the AEO 2015. As the agencies noted in 2016, 
gasoline price projections were substantially lower than the prices the agencies used in 
the original benefit-cost analysis of the 2017–2025 standards that they conducted in 2012. 
Between the AEO 2012 and the AEO 2015, expected gasoline prices decreased about 25 
percent. The lower prices reduce the value of fuel savings, and they also have indirect effects 
on benefits and costs.20 The lower value of fuel savings dominates the other effects, and 
that drop in expected gasoline prices between 2012 and 2015 reduced the benefits of the 
standards roughly in proportion to the price change.21 
The 2016 analysis included the effects on net benefits of the 2012–2015 gasoline price decrease. 
But if prices dropped further after 2015, this could further reduce benefits. However, figure 5 
shows that the most recent price projections in the AEO 2018 are very similar to those in the 
AEO 2015. Consequently, updating gasoline price projections would not affect net benefits.
Figure 5: Retail gasoline prices in various EIA Annual Energy Outlook editions (2017 $/gallon)
 
Source: EIA
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The estimated benefits also depend on miles traveled. For a given fuel economy improvement 
caused by standards, higher miles traveled implies larger fuel savings and carbon reductions. 
For example, suppose the standards reduce average emissions rates of new vehicles sold in a 
particular year by 10 grams of carbon dioxide per mile. The total carbon emissions reductions 
for vehicles sold in that year equal the change in emissions rate (10 grams per mile) multiplied 
by the number of vehicles sold and the average miles each of those vehicles is driven. 
Likewise, fuel savings depend directly on miles traveled, and a drop in miles traveled reduces 
estimated benefits. 
Although the EPA does not use the EIA AEO to project miles traveled of vehicles affected by 
regulation, it is instructive to compare AEO projections to assess whether the agencies might 
change their vehicle miles traveled (VMT) assumptions for their analysis of the standards. 
Figure 6 shows that between the AEO 2015 and the AEO 2018, projected VMT for the years 
2021–2035 decreased by an average of about 9 percent.22 This decrease implies that the value 
of fuel savings and carbon reductions in those years would be about 9 percent lower, reducing 
benefits proportionately.
Figure 6: Vehicle miles traveled in various EIA Annual Energy Outlook editions (billion miles)
 
Source: EIA
The share of light trucks in total sales can also affect the compliance costs. In their 2016 
analysis, the agencies estimated that the average cost per vehicle would be substantially 
higher for light trucks than for cars. For example, the EPA estimated that average costs would 
be about 50 percent higher for light trucks than for cars. More generally, it is often more 
technically challenging to add fuel-saving technology to light trucks than to cars, and many 
truck consumers are less willing to pay for hybrids and other fuel-saving technologies than 
are car consumers. Consequently, many of the public comments that the EPA received on its 
reconsideration of the midterm evaluation argued that a shift in consumer demand from cars 
to light trucks would increase the total costs of achieving the standards. 
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Since 2014 there has been a pronounced shift in new vehicle sales, from cars to light trucks. 
Gasoline prices appear to explain much of this shift, but other factors, such as rising incomes, 
may also play a role.23 Figure 7 shows a roughly 10 percentage point increase in light truck 
share between the 2012 and 2015 AEO editions.24  
Figure 7: Percentage of light trucks in total passenger vehicle sales in various EIA Annual Energy Outlook  
editions (% of total)
 
Source: EIA
Without running the agencies’ models, one can get a sense of the effects of a rise in light 
truck shares on compliance costs. Table 7 shows that using the EPA’s estimated costs for cars 
and light trucks, the shift between the AEO 2012 and the AEO 2015 would imply about a 5 
percent increase in average costs per vehicle. The decrease in the light truck shares between 
the AEO 2015 and the AEO 2018 implies a slight decrease in average costs. We note that this 
is a rough calculation based on aggregate cost estimates reported by the agencies, and it 
does not consider changes in market shares within classes.
Table 7: Effect of light truck market share on estimated per-vehicle costs by model year (2017 dollars)25
Model Year Cars Light Trucks
Average  
(using AEO 2012 
light truck shares)
Average  
(using AEO 2015 
light truck shares)
Average  
(using AEO 2018 
light truck shares)
2021 166 242 195 204 200
2022 321 492 386 406 396
2023 476 743 575 607 591
2024 632 994 765 808 787
2025 787 1,245 955 1,007 982
Average 477 743 575 606 591
Source: Authors’ own estimates based on EPA and EIA
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Putting these calculations together, a complete rollback of the 2022–2025 standards 
compared to maintaining current standards would not pass a benefit-cost test, even when 
accounting for changes in the SCC and projections of gasoline prices, vehicle miles traveled, 
and light truck sales shares. Using the Trump administration’s lower SCC would reduce 
benefits by no more than 15 percent and net benefits by 17–27 percent.26 Of the other three 
factors, only declining miles traveled would have a noticeable effect, reducing benefits by 
about 9 percent and net benefits by about 10 percent. Changes in projected gasoline prices 
and the light truck market share between the AEO 2015 and the AEO 2018 have negligible 
effects on estimated net benefits. Even combining the SCC and miles traveled effects would 
still result in negative net benefits of a full rollback. 
Consequently, the agencies would need additional arguments—either quantitative or 
qualitative—if the benefits of rolling back the standards are to exceed the costs. The EPA 
provided a number of possible arguments in its April 2 decision. For example, it may 
reconsider the adverse effects of tighter standards on the likelihood and severity of traffic 
accidents. As noted above, the agencies may also reconsider their treatment of the standards’ 
private benefits to consumers, which account for most of the societal benefits in the 
agencies’ 2016 analysis (see table 5). In its April 2 decision, the EPA also presented qualitative 
arguments that consumer benefits may actually be lower than previously estimated.27 Finally, 
the sharp decline in US oil imports reduces the macroeconomic benefits of lowering oil use, 
as the macroeconomic vulnerability to oil price shocks is lower when net imports are lower 
because of the reduced terms of trade effect.28 We have not considered these arguments 
here, as it is unclear at the moment how the EPA might incorporate these arguments in its 
benefit-cost framework. 
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The paper offers a common set of facts to inform the upcoming policy discussion about 
whether to ease the fuel economy standards from 2022–2025. Eliminating the fuel economy 
increases for 2022–2025 would have small effects on gasoline consumption, greenhouse gas 
emissions, and oil imports during those years and even out to 2030. However, the ultimate 
effects of weaker standards could be greater over time, especially if they hurt the progress of 
new technologies and the political momentum for tighter standards in the United States and 
in other countries in the longer term. 
This paper does not provide a full analysis to determine whether recent market changes and 
new information on compliance costs mean that the benefits of maintaining the planned 
tightening of the 2022–2025 fuel economy standards no longer exceed the costs. But 
it sufficiently demonstrates that changes to the social cost of carbon methodology and 
projections of gasoline prices, vehicle miles traveled, and light truck sales shares are unlikely 
to justify a complete rollback of the 2022–2025 standards. 
CONCLUSION
MAKING SENSE OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FUEL ECONOMY STANDARD ROLLBACK
23 |  CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMBIA SIPA
1. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “EPA Administrator Pruitt: GHG Emissions 




3. Ed Crooks and Patti Waldmeir, “US aims to relax vehicle emissions rules,” Financial Times, 
April 2, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/f83bb1b6-36ac-11e8-8b98-2f31af407cc8.
4. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “EPA to Reexamine Emission Standards for Cars 
and Light Duty Trucks -- Model Years 2022-2025,” press release, March 15, 2017, https://
www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-reexamine-emission-standards-cars-and-light-duty-
trucks-model-years-2022-2025.
5. See for example Dylan Yalbir, “Why Fuel Economy Standards Matter to U.S. Energy 
Dominance,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-
fuel-economy-standards-matter-us-energy-dominance.
6. Stephen Edelstein, “Which states follow California’s emission and zero-emission 
vehicle rules?,” Green Car Reports, March 7, 2017, https://www.greencarreports.com/
news/1109217_which-states-follow-californias-emission-and-zero-emission-vehicle-rules.
7. This is the authors’ own estimate based on state level and national new vehicle sales data 
provided by the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, https://autoalliance.org/in-your-
state/.
8. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2017), “Final Determination on the 
Appropriateness of the Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Standards under the Midterm Evaluation,” January 2017, p.6, https://nepis.epa.
gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100QQ91.pdf.
9. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2016a), “Draft Technical Assessment Report: 
Midterm Evaluation of Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2022-2025,” July 2016, 
p.12–61, https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100OXEO.PDF?Dockey=P100OXEO.PDF.
10. Ibid., p.1–21.
11. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2016b), “Proposed Determination on the 
Appropriateness of the Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Standards under the Midterm Evaluation: Technical Support Document,” 
November 2016, p.3–24, https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100Q3L4.pdf.
NOTES
MAKING SENSE OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FUEL ECONOMY STANDARD ROLLBACK
ENERGYPOLICY.COLUMBIA.EDU | APRIL 2018  | 24
12. Ibid., p.3–23.
13. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2017), p.6; a more detailed breakdown is available 
here: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2016a), p.12–61.
14. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2016a), p.12–63.
15. Eric Kulisch, “EPA’s Pruitt, automakers in lockstep over fuel economy standards,” 
Automotive News, April 3, 2018, http://www.autonews.com/article/20180403/
OEM11/180409894/epas-pruitt-automakers-in-lockstep-over-fuel-economy-
standards?cciid=read-next-link.
16. Note: Numbers in table 5 are computed from tables ES-6, ES-7, 12.82, and 13.25 in the Draft 
Technical Assessment Report. The CO2 benefits refer to the 3 percent average social cost 
of carbon numbers in the corresponding tables. All numbers have been converted to 2017 
dollars using the Consumer Price Index. Costs are reported as positive numbers, and net 
benefits are the difference between benefits and costs.
17. See for example Ted Gayer and W.Kip Viscusi (2013), “Overriding consumer preferences 
with energy regulations,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, June 2013, Vol. 43, Issue 3, 
p.248-264,  
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1c0b/c21ff5f260df3224f8a614026ead43b991a0.pdf.
18. For more discussion of the rationale for these choices and their implications, see Jason 
Bordoff, “Trump vs. Obama on the Social Cost of Carbon–and Why It Matters,” Wall Street 
Journal, November 15, 2017, https://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2017/11/15/trump-vs-obama-on-
the-social-cost-of-carbon-and-why-it-matters/.
19. Note: “CO2 benefits (global)” refers to the CO2 benefits reported in the Draft Technical 
Assessment Report. “CO2 benefits (domestic)” computes the CO2 benefits using the 
estimated social cost of carbon (3 percent discount rate) reported in the Regulatory 
Impact Analysis for the proposed repeal of the Clean Power Plan.
20. See Benjamin Leard, Joshua Linn, and Virginia McConnell (2017), “Fuel Prices, New Vehicle 
Fuel Economy, and Implications for Attribute-Based Standards,” Journal of the Association 
of Environmental and Resource Economists, September 2017, Vol. 4, Number 3, p.659-700, 
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/691688.
21. See Joshua Linn, Virginia McConnell, and Benjamin Leard (2016), “How Do Low Gas Prices 
Affect Costs and Benefits of US New Vehicle Fuel Economy Standards?,” Resources for the 
Future, September 2016, http://www.rff.org/research/publications/how-do-low-gas-prices-
affect-costs-and-benefits-us-new-vehicle-fuel-economy.
22. The lower VMT in the AEO 2018 reflects the California greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction targets through 2035, as well as updated travel data from the Federal Highway 
Administration.
23. See Benjamin Leard, Joshua Linn, and Virginia McConnell (2017), “Fuel Prices, New Vehicle 
Fuel Economy, and Implications for Attribute-Based Standards,” Journal of the Association 
of Environmental and Resource Economists, September 2017, Vol. 4, No. 3, p.659-700, 
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/691688. 
MAKING SENSE OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FUEL ECONOMY STANDARD ROLLBACK
25 |  CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMBIA SIPA
24. The decrease in the light truck share between the AEO 2015 and the AEO 2018 reflects 
updated sales data used to calibrate the model, as well as lagged responses to fuel prices 
and other factors.
25. Note: Per-vehicle costs by model year are from table 12.18 and 12.19 in the Draft Technical 
Assessment Report and are converted to 2017 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
The average costs are computed using the projected market share of light trucks from the 
indicated AEO edition, as depicted in figure 7.
26. This calculation uses a 3 percent discount rate. Using a 7 percent discount rate would 
reduce benefits by an additional 2 percent.
27. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Mid-term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Standards for Model Year 2022-2025 Light-duty Vehicles,” Federal Register Notice, April 
2, 2018, p.2-3, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-04/documents/mte-final-
determination-notice-2018-04-02.pdf.
28. United States, Council of Economic Advisers (2016), Economic Report of the 
President 2016, U.S. Government Publishing Office, February 2016, p.55-58, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ERP_2016_Book_Complete%20
JA.pdf; also see Christiane Baumeister and Lutz Kilian (2016), “Lower oil prices and the 
U.S. economy: Is this time different?,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2016, 
p.32-33, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/5_baumeisterkilian.pdf; 
also see Alan J. Krupnick et al. (2017), “Oil Supply Shocks, US Gross Domestic Product, 
and the Oil Security Premium,” Resources for the Future, November 2017, http://www.rff.
org/research/publications/oil-supply-shocks-us-gross-domestic-product-and-oil-security-
premium.
MAKING SENSE OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FUEL ECONOMY STANDARD ROLLBACK
ENERGYPOLICY.COLUMBIA.EDU | APRIL 2018  | 26
